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What H. L. A. Hart Did Not Explain* 
Richard Stith 
Valparaiso University School of Law 
! laborating first upon H. L.A. Hart's distinction between imposing duties and impos-
mg disabilities, th1s article explores the two senses mentioned (but not fully explained) 
hy Hart in which power-holders may be legally disabled. Legal invalidation (nulli-
fication) of norms that have been generated by vulnerable power-holders is seen 
•o reduce divcrs1ty or pluralism m every normative sphere, from the supranational 
•o the intrafamilial. By contrast, mere legal nonvalidation (noncognizancc) of such 
norms tends to preserve the autonomy of the power-holders that created the norms, 
•hus cnhancmg legal pluralism. Punishment for creating forbidden norms amounts in 
prinCiple to an in-between sort of control, less restnct1ve than completely invalidating 
·hem but more restrictive than JUSt not validating them, that is, just ignoring them. 
Illustrative examples include the European Court of justice's early use of invalidation 
to convert an international treaty into a supranational constitution, and the subtle 
effects of legal nonvahdation of same-sex marriage. 
One of the fundamental issues to be faced in our er.t of globali1.ation and 
\\.tning di\'ersity is the degree to which states and other norm-generc:tting 
bodiel> shall be pennitted to dominate infrnnational norm-generating enti-
un and the degree to which supranational institutions shall be permitted to 
dominate states and other norm-generating bodic'i. Recalling the work of 
\\t·.,Iey Hohfeld, 1 H. L.A. Han2 helps us understand two con tra'iting meth-
b of testricting an entity endowed with a leg-al pO\\er to generc:ttc norms: 
w imposition of duties \"ersliS the imposition of disabilities. Duties forbid 
·Jt<tin uses of the power in que tion, often under threat of punishment, 
lwrcas disabilities invalidate (nullify) any attempt so to usc that power. In 
"' short explonuorv essay, I supplement Hart's observations conceming 
ne two methods of control or domination, providing conceptual reasons 
'uspect that invalidation may be worse than punishment for purposes of 
• P.t~r ,ubmiucd for rli'c~ion a1 the "Oiver.tt)' and Lnity" mccung of the- XXIII World 
~r"''• lnt('mationale Vctctntgung fi"tr Rcdll.r und Smialplulosophic- Kr.ti:.0\1, Poland, 
'I J-6, 2007. 
I \\'tst..t.\ 110 HFTIJl, Ft '-1>.\MEli<T.-\l. LFG\1 C.oM.£PTlOS S ( 1923) . 
• II. LA. 11.\RT, Tm (~>:-.C.EYT or LA\1 26-41 , 6&-71 (2<1 eel. 1991). 1Ian refc-N to llohfcld 
a note to page 66 found at page 289. 
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lcg-dl diversity or pluralism. (\\11ethcr or when invalidation is in fact worse 
for plurdlism is an empirical question involving man) factors beyond the 
scope of this essay.) 
I also add and di~cu ·s a further distinction. that between invalidated 
exercises of a power and 7WIZYalidated exercises of that power-something 
Hart ne,·er clear!) explains. The logic of nonvalidation actually turns out to 
benefit pluralism, as we sec below. 
I. HART'S DISTINCTIONS 
In his classic work, The Concept of Law,?. Hart initially contrasts criminal 
laws, which can be considered "coercive orders,"1 with "laws which give 
powers"5 (such as rules for making wi.lls,6 contracts and marriages,' or city 
ordinances11), the second t) pe of rule being, in I I art's view, facili tative rather 
than coercive. 
This is all well and good ,,ith regard to acts that Ma) within the limits of 
the conferred legal powers but not always with regard to act<; that exceed 
those limit<;. Hart misleads us when he goe on to suggest that there is 
always a "rddical difference in function"9 between the Ctiminallaw, which is 
"designed to suppress" conduct, and power-conferring nile , which "mer~lv 
withhold legal recoj.,rnition"10 from acts that are ultra \'ires: "nullity can 
not ... he assimilated to a punishment attached to a rule ac; an inducement 
to abstain from the activities which the rule forbids." 11 Hart fails here to 
mention that legal nullification or invalidation is capable of being used verv 
effectively to control those who possess the power to generate legal norms. 
CnrimLsly, in his later discussion of how the highest mle of recognition 
(or constitution) can limit legislative powers, Hart focuses precisely upon 
what he previously ignored : 
I\ const..itut..ion which dfccti'·ely restricts the legislative powers of the supreme 
lcgislamre in the ~>)'Stem docs nol do so by imposing (or at any rate ueed not 
tmpmc) duties on the le~,'islature nol lo attempt to legislate in certain ways; 
3. ld. 
4. Jd. at26. 
5. ld. 
6. ld. at '1.7. 
7. Jd. 
8. Jcl. at 31. 
9. Jdat 3'1.. 
10. ltl- at 31. 
I I . ltL In l11is descr-ipuon of Hart's views of powers ami tht:"ir limits, I do not clistin),~ 
between privau• powers (suth ;c, the legal powf'r to make a coulrdt tor a will) and publk 
(such <IS the lcg<1l power to lf'gislate), bcca~ Hart himself conflate> the two. This conll 
may han· i>et:"n part of what led Hart to C'Onfusc invalidity (which in domestic law tencl~ 
to describe tilt• limi!S on public powers) with nonvalidity (which in dnrn!'sti<' law tends~ 
cle~cribe the lim ill> on prh-dll' powers). as is shown later in this I:'SSa). 
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instead it pnl\idc that any such purportt'd legislation shall be \oid. It imposes 
not legal duties but legal disahilities.11 
Invalidation serves here as a functional alternative to punishment, leading 
the Ie~-,rislatur<:> to sta} \\ithin its prcscriherl sph<:>re. The constitution makers 
have used null it' as a means of controlling the law makers. 
Disabilities are in fact a ''"irlelv eflective wav to resu i<.t the exercise of 
powers, even though I latt never applies this insight to the lower levels of 
those <:>mpowered to generate legal norms (e.g., contmct and city ordinance 
makers) that he discusses initially. The present essa)- fills this gap b) showing 
the dominating impact of invalidation on all t) pes of norm generators 
and then (in its last sections) <;uggests that T I an neglects ro discu~ this 
impact because he sometimes conflates rcstricthe invalidation and tolerant 
nomalidation. 
II. PUNISHMENT AND INVALIDATION 
Let us begin ''ith a simple modeL Suppo<;e C.tptain C hac; plenary legal 
power over Sergealll S, who in tum has plenaq legal power ow•r Private P. 
(Assume for <;implicit\' that no moral or other nonlegaluorms exist among 
C, S, and P.) Suppose funher that C thiuks P is becoming too exhausted 
from the daily hikes ordered b)'S anrl wishes to stop tomorrow's hike from 
t.tking place. C decides to do so bv imposing a duty on S; C tells S, "You 
,hall not order Pout on a hike tomorro\\." Let us also assume that C and 
S understand that S ,,;11 be punisherl if S does not rom pi) with C's ordet: 
1 Suppose also that the duties S imposes on P are hacked by threats ot 
punishment bv S for noncompliance by P.) ~otc that, b} hypothesis, C has 
hnc decided to control S solely h\ creating a rlury for S, uot b\' imposing 
.lll\ disabilit} on S. 
If S neYettheless orrlers P out on a hike, must P obey? The answer i<; n •..,, 
I•" S's power O\Cr P hac; been in no way limited. S has a rlut) not to send P 
out, hutS hac; no disability that would pre,·ent S ti·om doing so. \\1tat \\ill 
tht·n happen if S disobe}S C by ordering P out, anrl P disobcy1> S by refusing 
tu ~o? Both Sand P \\ill have 'violated a lq.r<~l duty, so both ''"ill he punished 
~ their respective supetiors. This in fact is probahlv how things would work 
out 111 the military. 
What if C could have taken a different tack, more ci,ilian than militaf) 
t"thos? Let us imat-,rine that instead of imposing any duty whatsoever on 
<. derides to protect P solei} b) cutting back on S's power, imposing a 
H.trt-t,·pe disability on S by saying, "You haYe no power to order P out on 
hilt• tomorrow." If S still o rrlers P out, P has no dut)' to obey. So "hat 
ppt•ns now if P refuses S's invalid order? Nritlll"r S nor P will be punished, 
- ld .It 69. 
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for neither ,;olated anv dUl\. 13 This, indeed, is ho\\ \\C ordinarii) deal \\ith 
state (or prO\incial) legislators who ,;oiate federal (or national) law when 
they purport to pass statutes. Since the state legislator.. are Iegalh disabled 
from passing statutes in violation of federal legal rules, such statutes would 
be declared invalid. But neither the legislators nor am citiLens who refu e 
to obc} the legislators would be pun ishcd.11 
There appear to be many advantages-as well as ome disadvantages-to 
disabilities-cum-invalidation over duties-rum-punishment as a method of con-
uolling persons (or institutions) ltke S that are mid-level norm generators. 
For one thing, im-dlidation would seem to be cheaper in that imprisonment 
is a\oided. Furthermore, etl<.'ttive im-alidation requires a more open and 
participatory societ} in which P know., of the right to refw;e S's order. Duucs 
are enforced top·dmm while disabilities arc made effective largcl} bottom-
up. P mav also preferS to ha\c a disability (rather than a dut}) because a 
disabilitv provides P \\ith a secure ·immunitY~ (Hohfeld's term) against any 
S<ommanded duty to hike rather than just a freedom from such a duty, 
a freedom that is precarious berau e it is re\'O<..able at an} moment by S 
(despite an> dut) C has imposed on S). On the other hand, a dutv-ouly 
approach (\\ itltout anv imposed disabilit}. as in our fir<;t scenario) ma\ be 
better for cfftriency, sccreC), and other militarv values. We shall sec that the 
dutv-onl)' approach also has the advantage of securing legal independence 
or pluralism, as we later examine <l legal world far remo,·ed from militan 
precision. In the "dualist" conception, as we shall see, intemational law is a 
law that imposes only duties, not domestic disabilities, upon states. 
Howe,·er, rather than exploring all the ad\antages of imposing disabili-
ties and / or duties, this essa)' focuses upon onlv one comparison. It seek.~ 
to understand whether punishment or im-alidation tends logicalh toward 
hrrcater domination of intermediate norm generator like S. At first sight, 
punishment may seem the harsher form of domination, because scemingl} 
the most painful. Indeed, ac; we see abo\'e, Hart denies that "nullity" ran 
e'en be considered a sanction, which of course is correct in the sense that it 
is ordinarily not a separable penal tv added to the criminal act. Furthermore, 
Hart often mini miLes any restrictive effects of disabilitics.15 And after all, 
13. Coercion ~till lurk.> m the- background, ho\\e\t:r, ino;ofar <1.'> S may no\\- bt• liablc tn ~ 
puni\hed by C tf he ~hould undertakc.- to puru!.h P for rdw.mg to com pi~ \\ith S's imalid orcin: 
14. \\e rntght still 53~. as .t matter of ordinary language, that the 'tall" lcgisl<ttorN h.t'C' a 
duty to abide bv ledc.-ral Ia" il'> wt"ll as a di<.ability to dt:\l.tte from it, but in any C\t>nt !.-uc'lt 
di5abtlit:y-("nforccd dutit>s arc not ord inarily bad.ed bv threat!. of puni!.hment. Accororng ID 
Mad bon·~ note~ on the American Con.>Ututional Comenrion, the method of enforcing fed~ 
law on the ~tales hy means of itwalioation of de\iancc rather than b\ mean~ of pum.,hmcnt fi 
de\ i,mce was cho!.en .rt 11:-ast parth lx-rame the Iauer approadt rould ha\t~ required fedenl 
militan intervention 'loiB 01 OFR\TES t~ tiiF Fro£RAl. Co~n:l'.-n0'-1 Ot 1787 RE.POKil n Blj 
~1Alli-.<>N 45, 88-89 (Norton, 1966). 
15. Hart states, for example, that a "Junge ... mav lx- indiflert>nt to the \alidity of his orcks. 
H 1\RT, Jupra note- 2, at 31. 
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the person solely under disabilities remains at liberty to behave as he wishes; 
his acL'>jul>l do not generate duties for olhers (or for himscll). 
Yet does having duties not leaveS with a 1-,rreater degree of norm-issuing 
freedom? If no disabilities arc imposed on him, S may still either create a 
duty for P (and maybe get punished) or else not create such a duty. S gets 
to choose. Increased certainty and severity of threatenerl punishment will, 
withoutanr doubt, yield greater empirical compliance by S. However, threats 
of future punishment can never amount to control in the absolute sense of 
the physical forcing of a person's body to do someone else's will or otherwise 
making disobedience impossible. Ewn in the face of the maximum possible 
threat--certain and eternal damnation-the one choosing whether to sin 
can claim .. I am the master of my fate: I am the captain of my soul. "Hi 
Invalidation, by contrast, restricts norm generation <1bsolutely. If S is 
stripped of his power to create a duty for P, the creation of a rluty tor P 
becomes impossible for him. He is forced to conform to C's wishes. JTe 
can no longer choose to be an outlaw. This is a clear loss of freedom for 
S-and perhaps of dignit} as well, e\en if P docs not decide to act cockily 
and strut his new rights. Going back to religion ag-ain, when God told Arlam 
and Eve that they would be punished if they ate the forbidden fruit, they 
were still left with free will-with the choice to sin or not. Invalidation is 
the equivalent of God putting a force field around the tree, stopping them 
absolutely from eating its fruit. The force field would have wholly deprived 
them of freedom to pick the fruit and of any dignity that comes with that 
freedom. In terms ofliberty, it is less restrictive to have one's hands slapped 
1han to ha,·e them tied. 
~1oreo,cr, as a conceptual matter, punishment in itself (without invalida-
tion) result'> in greater legal pluralism-more independent legal systems or 
,pheres-than docs invalidation in it<ielf (withom punishment). Where C 
,ubjects S only to duties (even backed by certain and severe punishments), 
one need look only to S in order to know P's duties. There may be two 
<.t"parate legal spheres quite independent of each othet, one centered on 
(.and the other on S. By contra<;t, if C uses disabilities to controlS, Swill 
ha\'e a reduced sphere within which S can shape the law for P. ln order 
to know P's duties, one must now refer to the acts of C as well a<; to the 
(ommands of S, for some of the latter may have been invalidated by the 
former. For C to convert his orders from duties to disabilities would thus be 
ro abrogate much of S's ability to create an autonomous legal sphere. The 
pluralism left intact by C not imposing disabilities on S should be favorerl 
tr. the military because instant obedience by Pis an important good and P 
n more quickly and easily discover his duties if he need not look beyond 
t' commands of S. 
lh William Emest Henley, lnvrctus, in MoDER.'! BKIIISH POt. I KY (Louis l.;ntermcycr ed., 
-~~~. rwailablt at http://wW\\.bartlt>by.com/ I 03/ 7.hllul. 
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The preservation of such legal pluralism likewise must be a primary rca-
son why countries such as the United Kingdom ha\C traditionally adhered 
to the "dualist" understanding of international versus national law referred 
to abme. Precisely insofar as international Ia\\ can impo e only duties, it 
can ne\'er in any wav affect the Btitish Parliament's monopoly of domes-
tic lawmaking power. Under a dualist regime, international treaties haYe 
no domestic e!Tect unless and until they are implemented by the national 
lcgislantre. 13} contrast, a .. monist" approach to international law allows in-
ternational norms to supplement and even to invalidate national ones, thns 
creating a single legal universe with concomitalll loss of national sovereignty. 
Since some of us may not have much sympathy for sergeants, let us leave 
our simple C-S-P model and look further at the analogous way · in which 
invalidation can diminish political independence among nations. The legal 
history of the European Community offers us a powe1 ful example of how the 
shift from duties to disabilities changed independent nations into subparts 
of a new legal entity. Such a seismic shift is by no means unthinkable in 
other regional economic associations as well and e\'en on a world scale 
through organit.ations such as the United Nations and the World Trade 
Organintion. 
From its inception, the European Community treat) contained legal du-
ties imposed on its members as well as \'arious enforcement mechanisms 
a~-,rainsr \'iolaLOrs of those dutics. 17 The fact that these enforcement mecha-
nisms were original!} emisioned by the signatories of the treaty shows clearly 
that the signawries assumed that member states might violate rhe treaties, 
that is, that violation was possible. However, in 1963 and 1961, in the ~'t.zn 
Cend m toos and Co.~ta cases, 18 the European Court of justice took it upon 
itself to convert certain of those duties inLO disabilities, making violation of 
the treaties impos:.ible. 
The specific duty invol\'cd in the \fan Gend Pn Loos case was the duty not 
to raise tariff.<; on imports from other member states. The Court found that 
by reclassifYing a certain good, the Netherlands in cncct had increased its 
import tariff on that good. :-.Jo problem so far. According to the treaties, I he 
Netherlands was thus su~ject to being prosecuted for its treaty violation. 
But the Court decided that the rule against raising tariffs would be more 
"effective" if raising tarif!:S were converted from something prohibited 10 
something impossible. The Court declared the increase in tariff to be simpll 
invalid; the importer was told, in effect, that he need not comply \\ith 
Dutch law, or rather, that the Dutch law in question did not really exisL 
The Netherlands did not have to be condemned as a lawbreaker becau~ 
it was disabled from breaking the law no matter how hard it tried (and so 
17. The an.ides refeneclto here were first nnmhercd 169-171 but m·e 11m' Article~ 226-2'l8 
of the T1·eat) F.st.ahlishing the. European L' nion. The specified puni~hment J(lr violatiom, nnw 
founrl in Artklt· 228, W<L~ not pre~cnt in the mid-1 960s, howe\ cr. 
18. Ca)c 26/ 62, Van G<>nd en Loos ' · Ncderlandse \dmini>rraue dcr Bclastingen, 1965 
E. CR. I; Ca!>C 6/ 64. Cos La,._ ENF.L, l 904 E.C.R. 585. 
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treaty procedures for a posteriori prosecution lost much of their point). 
next year, in Costa, the Court reaffirmed it'i supranationalist position 
gteater clarity, and founeen years later, in Simmenlha~ 19 it made clear 
t e\eu rules long found in national constitutions have no domestic legal 
ret if thev contravene subsequent treaty nonns. 
Ordinal) legal reasoning would have held that if there were a contlict 
·een an earlier domestic constimtional nonn and a later imernationaJ 
ary norm, the treat) norm would be the one that would be invalid under 
me~tic law, although (according to dualist reasoning) the nation in ques-
~n might still be su~ject to condemnation and possibly a penalty under 
ternationallaw. 
One might pause here to note an outstanding feat ofjudicial activism: the 
luropean Court ofjustice created a new polity by changing an international 
tn-aty into a const.itution.~0 But let us keep our attention fixed on the 
etherlands. European Community law penetrated and took possession of 
Dutch law, making Dutch dissenters (here, those who objected to paying the 
lil.x) the agents of Europe. From that point on, European norms would be 
directly applicable and supreme in Dutch courts and in all other domestic 
mstin1tions, and the European Court would defend the rights of Dutch 
mdividuals against the Dutch people. 
lJnder this new legal rchrimc, the European Community became able to 
dominate the etherlands far more "effectively" (ac; the European Court 
aptly recognized) than it could have done by means of mere duties. \J\'hethcr 
this is good or bad depends to a great extent on how much we care about 
Dutch political and cultural unity and independence, on the one hand, and 
the individual freedoms of Dutch traders, on the other. 
We can, however, make some generalizations. It is no doubt true that the 
person on the ground, the individual citizen, has more freedom from rluties 
under a system in which intermediate authorities are limited by invalidation, 
as compared to one in which they are limited only by punishmeut. Invali-
dation inherently fa,ors individual liberty to hdzaveas one wishes insofar as 
it reduces the total number of duties with which individuals have to comply 
b' invalidating some of them, cutling down on the dutv-generating power 
of some of their political superiors. It is tautologically true that limiting 
government is good for Iibert} from go,·ernment. 
At the same time, invalidation sharply curtails group and even individual 
autonomy, for to be auto-nomoLLS (self-lawgiving) would seem to include pre-
cisely the ability to create duties for oneself. If only the threat of punishment 
is imposed on a group, it can still decide to resist its overlord ac; long as it is 
willing to chance suffering the prescribed sanction. If the duties the group 
19. Case 106177, Amministr.t7ione delle Finan£e dello Stall I v. Simmcnthal SpA, 197R F..C.R. 
629. 
l!O. For reflections on the Court\ bootsuapping. seeR Stith &.J.H.H. Weiler, Car~ Trl'flty T.nw 
lk SujJrmu, Diri'Ctly Ejjeclwt and .\uto11mnmu-ML at/Itt Same llmc7 (1\n l~jJi.\lnlnry F.wllllllJ{e), 31 
'\.Y.U . .J. b'T'L L. & Pot.. 729 (2002). 
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(e.g., the Dutch people) decides to impose on ito;elf can be invalidated 
from above, the f.,TTOup has lost its autonomy. Moreover, a degree of indi\id-
ual freedom has been lost as well: the freedom to effectuate legal change 
through the legal process. A Dutch voter can no longer aim to reclassify 
imports in a way that raises any tariffs, if such acl'i arc legal nullities. 
Individual autonomy (binding oneself by a mle) can suffer still more 
seriously from invalidation. Consider the power to contract, a form of pri-
vate lawmaking. Even if contracts were punished, as long as they remained 
valid, the choice to create legal duties for oneself would remain open. For 
example, if contracl..'. to pay gambling debts were no longer invalid (as they 
usually are now) but were instead merely punishable, individuals could still 
bind themselves by law to pay such debts. (Of course, if the punishment were 
severe and certain, they would be unlikely to exercise this lawmaking free-
dom.) Again, where marrying without a license (e.g., so-called "common-
law" marriage) is illicit but still valid (e.g., in the law of equity), perhaps 
even punished but not nullified, indi\iduals retain more ability to marry 
unofficially than they would if an unlicensed marriage were wholly invalid. 
Likewise for bigamy: if a second marriage were possible but punishable, 
the ability to have multiple spouses would be far greater than it is now, ec-
ond marriages being null. Similarly, if same-sex marriages somehow were 
prohibited and punished (even by a term in jail) but remained valid once 
illegally begun, gays and lesbians would ob\iously ha,·e much more power 
to bind themsch·es in marriage than under today's regimes in which their 
marriages are an absolute nullity.21 
I conclude that invalidation is an enormously powerful tool of domina-
Lion, more powerful than punishment alone as a means to limit the auton-
omy of groups and even of indhiduals. Insofar as we may wish to preserve 
pluralism in law and legal culture, we must be careful to di-;tinguish inval-
idation from punishment and to use the former with caution as we build 
new leg-al orders in the world. 
Ill. NONVALIDATION 
Anyone familiar with Hart's initial discussion of legal powers and their 
limits will find it hard to imagine that he and 1 are describing the same 
legal phenomenon. As we see briefly aboYe, Hart at first depicts legal pow-
ers as wholly beneficent, as simply intended to facilitate decentralized law-
making. So he says that the purpose of requiring two witnesses for a will's 
validity or reciprocal consideration for contractual validity is just to give 
people easy-to-follow recipes for making rules that the government will en-
force. Moreover, the disabilities implied here (no legal validity without two 
2l. Of cour~e. whc1e invalidation and punishment are combiut>d, iudi~idual~ are ma.'l.i-
mally limited. American law does this to prevent big;un' b) boU1 declaring ~cond marriages 
impossible and puni~hinK those who attempt to do what C. legally impo!>Siblc. 
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tnesses or without consideration) arc not in I ended to stop a dying person 
m informally communicating her wishes to just one witness nor to stop 
om1al promising v .. ithout any reciprocall:x>ncfit. 
Hart is indeed correct that his early examples do not have the supprcs-
e aims or consequences discussed above in the hypothetical example 
CJI the military superior and the actual example of the European Com-
munity. It would be very strange to see the rules for wills or contracts as 
draconian means of making testation-without-two-witnesses and promises-
"ithout-reciprocity impossible. No one seeks to put an end to deathbed 
rrquests and extralegal promises. The law doe~ not validate such informal 
iikl~ but it has nothing ag-ainst their ha ... ing social force. Yet, as Hart later 
discusses, when a constitution imposes limits on legislative power, such as 
a rule against raising import taxes, its purpose is to make such ultnt vires 
ans ineffective, to deprive them of all social force, just as C's disabling of 
S was meant to stop P from ha ... ing to go out on a hike. The nature of this 
difference, I maintain, can be grasped by understanding the first discussion 
in Hart's classic work to deal \vith nomttlidation and the second to deal with 
irl\ttlidation. 112 
Invalidation occurs when one normative order declares the rules of an-
other order to be no longer internally binding, to be nullities within that 
other order. Nonvalidation occurs when a normative order refuses within 
itself to recognize and efTectuate the rules of another order but docs not in-
terfere with continued recognition and effectiveness of those nonns within 
that other order. 
Thus, for example, invalidation occurs when C declares that S has no 
power over P, perhaps even impl)ing that P can come to C for a remedy if 
S nc\ertheless should attempt to use illicit force ag-ainst P. Nomr<Liidation 
of S's order would mean only that C \viii not treat P's refusal to hike as an 
offense against C. Again, invalidation occurs when the European Court tells 
participants in the Dutch legal order that tariff increases are no longer to 
be treated by them as valid >vithin the Netherlands. Nonvalidation would 
mean only that Dutch domestic tariff reclassifications do not count as valid 
accommodations of the .:-.:etherlands's international treaty obligations. 
Nonvalidation of promises made without consideration lets them retain 
whatever normative force they have as a moral matter; they are simply not 
enforced in courL Another example: a secular state may refuse to validate 
religious man;age \'OWS legallv \\ithout necessarily seeking to invalidate 
them from a social perspective. Only if it sought to do the latter would the 
22. Set' ll~rn , ~upra note 2, at 26, 27, 3 I, 32, 31, 69. The clislinclion in this essay between 
nomalidation and irwalidation overlaps to some dcgre<."with that between ·,oid" and ",·oiclable" 
or"null" and "nullifiable" acLs and like distin~ttons. \'oicl atts are simpl) ignored by thf' law (e.g., 
a "marriage" of two six-year-<>lds or "legislatton" bv a Ia\\ faculty establishing a nation a.! religion) 
because they arc wholly null. \'otdable acts are one~ that originally have some leg-al existence 
thar the law may undertake to nullifv (e .g., a marriage caused by fraud in some essential 
re.pect or legislation by Congrc~ establishing a religion). fhe fomtca rna) be, surpri~ingl), 
more fa,·orable to pluralism than lhe latter, as we see he low. 
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state aim to interfere radically with the autonomy of the moral ordet;ngs 
formed by such nonlegal vows. 
Par.tdoxicall), then, although the difference between invalidation and 
nomalidation may seem but a nuance, it matters greatly. \Vhile invalidation 
is bv ib definition more effective than punishment in stopping intermediate 
norm generation, nonvalidation i more benign thaJt punishment in letting 
such norm generation continue. Invalidation of matrimonial promi es rc.:-
stricts them more ahsolutcl} than docs even se\ere punishment for making 
such promises, hut e\cn a mild punishment would be more inhibiting than 
mere nonvalidation of such promises (i.e., simply ignoring them) would be. 
This conceptual distinction between invalidation and nom"<~.lidation ma} 
stand out still more clearly if we re\erse for a moment the order of morality 
and legality, illuminating two differing \\a}-s in which moralit\ ma} pass 
judgment on law. 
We discnss above how law may fail to validate moral nonns legal I) without 
thcreh} aiming to invalidate them morally. A'i a posithist, I lan rnal...cs a 
similar point with regard to moral invalidation of law. A1-,rainst the radical 
claim that "an unjust law is not a Ia\\," that is, that an uqjust, immoral 
law is legally invalid, Hart asserts that a properly enacted law remains such 
even if it is nonbinding in a moral o;ense. For Hart, a legal rule cannot he 
invalidated by moralit}, though it rna} well be nonvalid in terms of moral 
obligation. Hart makes this distinction in important part for the sal...c of 
p luralist thought, seeking to preserve a conceptual separation between law 
and morality \\ithout disparaging the role of either.23 
Here is a succinct example illustrating the inner logic of the po<>sibilitic~ 
we are dio;cw;sing in oi-der of increasingly greater restriction on internH.'"-
diate nonn generation: validation, nonvalidation, punishment, and finally 
invalidation. 
Suppose that two parents are having trouble getting their child to go to 
bed by 9 P.M. They might wish f(>t· the state to validatt' the 9 1'.1\t. duty they 
have imposed on their child in order to gi\e that duty greater authori!\. But 
if state law refuses to back the parents up officially, this nont~alidation (the 
mere absence of official recognition) causes them no loss. The filial duty to 
obe} remains intact as a matter of mor<~.lity, religion, custom, and the like. 
By contrast, the tate could declare that making a child go to bed so carl} 
is child abuse and could forbid the parents to impose a 9 1'.1\t. bedtime, 
backing up thi'i state-imposed parental duty with a threat to punish them if 
they continue to tell their child to go to bed by 9 p.m. Yet at the mnc time, 
state law might still say and do nothing regarding the moral, religious, and 
other nonns that would support am 9 P.~t. duty upon which the parents 
migh t defiantly insist. The filial duty to go to bed could thus remain intact, 
albeit nomolidated (and e\cn punished) as a matter of state law. 
2~. /d. at 207-212. 
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Finally, the state could declare iL<;elfsupreme and d irectl) efTcctive in all 
nonnative realm.,, mtJalidating c,·ery sort of norm requiting going to bed 
at 9 1'.\t. and informing the child of its moral and le~al righ t to sta) up 
late. Clearly, tl1i~ lac;t ell.et ti),c of state power could be the most desu•rclive 
of family autonomv. Yet there is a condition afTecting i~ cffican slill to be 
d ic;cmsed. 
IV. A FURTHER CONDITION FOR NONVALIDATION 
The \cry possibilit\- of nonvalidation (rather than im~aJidation) of an act 
depends on the act in question having some force or purpose independent 
of the achievement oflcgal validity in the normathe order that is gran ting 
or deming '>Uch validit). 
lf ''e look back to Hart's nonreprcssive sor~ of disabilities, such as 
the di ability to make legally enforceable contrac~ in the absence of re-
ciprocal consideration, we can see that the power-holders iu qnec;tion 
ha\e no desire to have their nonvalidated infonnal acts become legally 
validated. :-.Jo one is demanding that the set of "tontracts \\ithout con-
,ideralion" or the c;et of "wills with only one wiUlc'>l> ~ become valid (as 
t~pposed to arguing that particular acll> do not fall ''ithin these sets).24 
:\orwalidation is an option because eVCI)'One i!, satisfied to have the Ia\\ 
rgnore '>UCh informal norm creation. 
Consider, bv con~dSt, the foJJo,,ing report: in 2007, the .\'l'w York Tzmrs 
r.tn a story about parents who had organi1ed to obtain birth tertificates for 
their ~tillhorn children. The\ wanted the state to certifY that their children 
had once existed. "It's about dij:.,rn ity and validity. lr'o; the same rca.-.on why 
we want things like marriage licensee;," declared a leader.2'' Insofar as par-
ents come to depend upon state validation for the Yery existence o f theit 
1 hildrcn and marriages, they gi\'e nonvalidalion the same etlt:ct over their 
lr\TS a-. invalidation would ha\'e. Furthermore, b~ insisting upon validation, 
they tempt the state to extend its power. It would require great self~rel>tr.tint 
.md a kind of paternalism on the pan of the state fo• it to resist this otler 
nf overlordship--for the state to tl)' to encourage these patent'> to seek tl1e 
.,,urance the} net'd from nonstate sources. After all, if lhe state does noth-
mg, it will be blamed for the nonexistence of kev family goods, c;o (unless 
rt would inwr large costs in doing so) it might ac; well get into the husine l> 
or deciding which children and marriages deserve legal recognition. ln at 
kast a de facto sense, lhe option of nonvalidation no longer C'xic;ts, because 
the parcntc; have abdicated their extralegal autonomy. 
24. nw n·ason lor thi~ apathv is ob\touslr that minimally adt:4L1..1le reciprocal consideration 
nd a second \\illlt""-~ amount to \irtually cos tiel<> lonnalities, so lhat k" tf any l'arl" about ha\'ing 
, lit within thcit :.trit hur' 
:2.'•. Tamat Lewin, Out nfC.11'f (,rvws an Advornryfor I ega/ CntifirnLP nJSIILI.bom Btrlh. :\! .'\~ Tt~fi'S, 
l.t\ 22, 2007, at \16 (quotmg thl" woman ""ho ~tartecl tht' moH·mcllt"}. 
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In like manner, if the bedtime-concerned parents discussed abme feared 
to cxetcise any extralegal authority so that they felt they could not ~ 
their children to do anvthing except that \\hich th(" l>tate would reco1,rni~ 
and suppor1, the) would ha\e voluntarily relinquished th("ir normathc Ill-
dependence. There would no longer be an~ family sphere that could ht 
left mere!) nonvalidated bv the stale (and thus still normativeh binding tn 
''ti nonlegal ways).-
ln other words, Hart's disabilities are stably nonreslricti\c-open to con-
tinuing interpretation as nonvalidation rather than a<; in\'alidation-onh 
insofar as two conditions obtain. First, the 1.uperior order must impose a 
disability only as to ill> own legal order; it must not neg-t1te the informal 
norms (or nonns operative in a separate leg-al sphere) supporting the prac-
tice in question, such as the practice of informal promising or raising impo11 
ta"cs; it mtL'it not reach down to destroy an othenvise autonomous nonna-
tive order. Second, that latter order must have internal strength; it tnu5t 
not come to depend for its imcmal validity on higher-level recognition or 
even on the absence of higher-level invalidation. Informal promi ing can-
not remain full) autonomous if onl} noninvalidated promising comes to be 
felt binding, nor can Dutch law remain autonomous if it refuses to enforce 
an) laws that have been rejected in the international realm. A nation whose 
own constitution i entirely monist \\ith rebrard to international law depend~ 
for ill> independence upon the pleasure of the m.tke• and interpreters of 
international law. 
Indeed, if a lower-lc\el nonnative community has 'iufficient c;trength, it 
may e'en be able to counter a higher legal authority's allt:mpll> to imalidatc 
its norms. l .ower-lcvel actors may continue to abide by officiall) invalidated 
n01rns, that is, the)' mav treat those nom1s as merely nonvalidated. Thus 
even common-law maniages and gambling debts that are wholly imalid 
according to state law may in fact retain significant force fm the parties 
engaged in them. Like\\<ise, a powerful country (e.g., the United States) 
may simply ihrnore the findings of some international legal tribunal that 
certain domestic norms lack \alidicy• (e.g., certain pmcedures for imposing 
the death penalt}') . ln the same wa), a fiercely ftlial child could treat an 
officially inv-alid bedtime rule as rnerclv nomalid and insi ton obsenring it. 
Indifference to official invalidation can tum it practicallv inLO nonvalida-
tion. 
A din:rse or plural legal world thus docs not depend only on making na-
tional and supranational orders less hegemonic; it depends also on persons 
~6. J ohu Fim1i~ agrees mth H. L.A. Han that a moralh unjust Ia" 1emains .1 \alid hm for 
many 1-"'rpo~es (lor exam pi<', tlmt of conceptual clarit)), .dheat non,alid ~ ,, moa .tl nonn. Yet 
iua.smuch as th<" foe. a! sen..e of law, for Finni\, contains a mor.1.l obhgauon of obedience, an 
unjiLst law cannot be a Ia'' in thi\ full focal sense. j<HI'I r.,, • .,, NI\Tl.H..\1 LAw \1\D '1\Tl R"-1 
RIGIITS 351-36!! ( 1980). rr (or \\'hen or \\here) a Ia\\ lllllSt be mOI.tl in order tO count as a law, 
momlicy cau onh valid.!le or invalld.ttt" it; an tmju$t Ia\\ that as merely morallv nonvalid {but 
not lcgallv imalid) <an b\ definition no longer ehl5t. r.," sun end<'r<i 11!1 syst<"mic independence 
iu~ofar a.s it needs moral \.llidauon. 
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and groups refraining from seeking higher recognition or enforcement of 
their internal norms. It could be unfortunate for humanity if each and 
t>very human norm were subject to state validalion, even if most were to 
be granted legal validity. We might not \vish every promise, every private 
family and fdendship event or duty, to be registered and overseen even by 
.1 benevolent State. In like manner, we might not wish every national law to 
be subject to the approval of even the most well-intentioned international 
or supranational legal regime. 
V. THE EXAMPLE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
-\ useful illustration of the ambiguous benefh of state validation and yet 
the complexity of resistance can be seen in the topic of same-sex marriage. 
Deparling from its draconian treatment of bigamy (and, historically, misce-
~enation), current American Jaw nowhere "prohibit-;" extralegal same-sex 
marriage in the sense of punishing it; people of the same sex have full 
bchaviontl Iibert} to engage in wedding ceremonies, to bind themselves 
rnorall} and even by leg-al contract regarding property and the like, and to 
live together thereafter.27 But, except in Massachusetts2R and California,2v 
.\merican law docs not validate such marriages qua marriages. By and large, 
the law just ignores them-leaves them alone. 
The current debate over same-<;ex marriage may mrn precisely on the 
distinclion between invalidation and nonvalidation. Some may view the 
, urrent absence of validation of same-sex marriage as a relatively tolerant 
,ystern of nonvalidation, one that leaves gay and lesbian cultural norms 
intact and unregulated. Others may view the current legal regime as closer 
to relatively hostile invalidation, which declares such unions to be without 
practical effect. 
Perhaps the status of same-sex bonds depends upon rhe purpose of mar-
riage for the gay and lesbian community or upon the purpose of each 
mdh idual same-sex marriage for those entering into it. If the point of 
... "lme-sex marriage is to gain the tax and retirement benefits hitherto open 
only to heterosexuals or to obtain a supposed moral imptimatur from the 
l.lw, refusal of legal recognilion amounts in effect to invalidation, whatever 
11s intent ma} be. In order to obtain these goods, validation would have 
to be sought, even at the price of regulation (e.g., application of bigamy 
tnd divorce law). By contrc:tSt, if those entering such a marriage were con-
tt•nt to bind themselves bra mutual promise of lifelong fide lity or content 
to secure nonlegal forms of moral recognition by the community, legal 
'1.7. Richard Stith, KP?JingFrimd.ship C'nrrgulatl'd, 18 NoTRF DA.~tE.J.L. Ell iiC~ & Pl'B. PoL\' 
• >3, 261 (200~) . n. 4. 
:?8. Su Goodridge v. DcpL of Public llcalth, 440 Mass. 309, 798 X.F .. 2d 941 (2003). 
:?9. ~In re Maniagc Cal;c~. 43 Cal.4lh 757 [76 C.al.Rpu·.:ld 683, IR3 P.3d 3!!41 (200R). 
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nourccogniLion would do little or nothing to undo those effect<; and could 
be more appropriately characteri?ed as nomalidaLion. 
Failure to pcrcehe the difference between invalidation and nonvalidation 
may lead lesbian and gay communiLies to think that state validation is a 
prerequisite to all normative stature, not reali7ing that nonvalidation could 
actually be a means to protect the moral and social autonom} of same-sex 
unions. By comparing onlv invalidation and validation, the} rna} fail to 
consider nomr.alidation as a possible way to achieve normative stature while 
avoiding state intrusion into private life. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Invalidation of duties that have been generated by \1.llncrablc normaLive 
orders can reduce di\etsity or pluralism in evcrv sphere, from the suprana-
Lional to the inrrafamilial. In contra.'it, nonvalidation of those same duties 
may preserve the autonomy of the normative spheres in which the duLies 
atise. Punishment for creati ng forbidden duties amounts in principle to 
an in-between sort of control, less restrictive than completely nullifying the 
duties but mo re restrictive than just ignoring their existence. Once properly 
clarified , Hart's work helps us understand these fundamental distinctions. 
